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ABSTRACT
Long-term care represents one of the largest uninsured financial risks facing the elderly in the United
States. Whether the small size of this market is driven primarily by supply side market imperfections
or by limitations to demand, however, is unresolved, largely due to the paucity of data about the
structure of the private market. We provide what is to our knowledge the first empirical evidence on
the pricing and benefit structure of long-term care insurance policies. We estimate that the typical
policy purchased by a 65-year old has an average pricing load of about 18 percent and has a very
limited benefit structure, covering only one-third of the expected present discounted value of long-
term care expenditures. These findings are consistent with the presence of supply side market
imperfections. However, we also find enormous gender differences in pricing  ￿ typical loads are
44 cents on the dollar for men but better than actuarially fair for women  ￿ that do not translate into
differences in coverage. And, although purchased policies provide limited benefits, we demonstrate
that more comprehensive policies are widely-available at similar loads, but are rarely purchased.
These findings suggest that while supply-side market imperfections exist, they are not the primary
cause of the small size of the private long-term care insurance market.
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As the baby-boom generation approaches retirement, concerns about financial security in retirement 
are increasing in importance as a public policy issue.  One of the largest uninsured financial risks facing 
the elderly in the United States today is expenditures for long-term care, such as home health care and 
nursing homes. Expenditures for long-term care were $135 billion in 2004, representing 8.5% of total 
health expenditures for all ages and about 1.2% of GDP.  Importantly, only 4 percent of these 
expenditures are paid for by private insurance, while one-third are paid for out of pocket (CBO, 2004). By 
contrast, in the health sector as a whole, private insurance pays for 35 percent of expenditures and only 17 
percent are paid for out of pocket (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002).   
The limited insurance coverage for long-term care expenditures has important implications for the 
welfare of the elderly. Its importance will only become more pronounced as the population continues to 
age and as medical care costs continue to rise. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office projects that real 
long-term care expenditures will triple by 2040 (CBO, 1999).  
Standard insurance theory suggests that the random and costly nature of long-term care expenditures 
makes this precisely the type of risk for which risk averse individuals would find insurance valuable. As a 
result, an extensive theoretical literature has proposed a host of potential explanations for the limited size 
of the private long-term care insurance market (see Sloan and Norton, 1997 or Norton, 2000 for a review 
of this literature).  An important divide in these explanations is whether they assume that the limited size 
of the market is due primarily to factors that limit demand for private insurance (such as the public 
Medicaid program, the informal insurance provided by family members, or limited consumer rationality) 
or to supply side market failures (such as asymmetric information, imperfect competition, or uninsured 
aggregate risks).  
Conceptually, it is possible to learn about the existence and importance of supply side market 
imperfections by studying the characteristics of the insurance policies that are offered and purchased in 
the private market.  This is because the major potential supply side limitations, including high 
transactions costs, imperfect competition, asymmetric information, or the aggregate risk of rising costs,  
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have at least one of two empirical implications.  First, these imperfections may cause prices to be higher 
than actuarially fair levels.  Second, these imperfections may cause contracts to offer a constrained set of 
benefit options that are less than fully comprehensive; we refer to a restriction on the comprehensiveness 
of offered insurance contracts as “quantity rationing.”   
Unfortunately, the literature thus far has been hampered by the paucity of relevant information about 
the basic characteristics of the private long-term care insurance market. In addition to limiting our 
economic understanding of the causes of the small market size, the lack of evidence impairs informed 
public policy making as well. For example, concerns about perceived high prices in this market have 
recently motivated the introduction of generous tax subsidies to long-term care insurance at both the 
federal and state level (Wiener et al., 2000; Cohen and Weinrobe, 2000) as well as proposals for further 
expansion of these subsidies (Lewis et al., 2003). Yet we know of no evidence on whether prices are 
substantially above actuarially fair levels in this market, let alone whether this is an important factor in 
explaining the market’s limited size. 
To begin filling this void, this paper provides, to our knowledge, the first estimates of the loads on 
private insurance policies and the share of expenditure risk covered by these policies. To do so, we 
develop an analytical framework for estimating the pricing load and the comprehensiveness of private 
long-term care insurance contracts. We implement these frameworks using detailed actuarial data on the 
distribution of long-term care expenditure risk and market-wide survey data on the characteristics of 
typical policies.  We also investigate the extent to which supply-side market failures are important in 
understanding the limited size of the private market.  
The key findings of this paper are that supply side limitations do exist in this market, but that these 
limitations are not primarily responsible for the limited size of the market.  The evidence for the existence 
of supply side imperfections is that commonly purchased policies exhibit high average prices and limited 
benefits.  Our central pricing estimates indicate that the typical policy purchased by a 65-year old (which 
is roughly the average age of purchase) and held until death has a load of 0.18.  In other words, on 
average, an individual who buys a long-term care insurance policy will get back only 82 cents in expected  
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present discounted value benefits for every dollar paid in expected present discounted value premiums. 
This is substantially higher than the typical load of 0.06 to 0.10 on purchased acute health insurance 
policies (Newhouse, 2002). With regard to quantity, we find that typically purchased policies cover only 
one-third of the expected present discounted value of long-term care expenditures.   
However, we present several additional pieces of evidence that suggest that these high prices and 
limited benefits are not the primary cause of the small size of the private long-term care insurance market. 
We find enormous differences in loads based on gender, yet these large pricing differentials do not 
translate into differences in coverage.  Loads on the typical policy purchased are 44 cents on the dollar for 
65 year-old men, and better than actuarial fair prices (a load of –0.04 cents on the dollar) for women.  
Despite these better than actuarially fair prices for women, insurance coverage rates for elderly women 
are very low and similar to those of elderly men at about 10 percent. Nor can these findings be explained 
solely by high within-household correlation in coverage decisions. In well over half of married 
households where at least one spouse has insurance, the other spouse does not have insurance. 
In addition, we find that although the typical purchased policy provides only limited coverage, 
insurance companies offer policies that cover a substantially larger share of long-term care expenditures. 
We demonstrate that there are widely available policies that will cover about 90 percent of the expected 
present value of expenditures for a 65 year old.  Moreover, these policies are available at similar loads to 
the less comprehensive policies that are typically purchased; thus for women, they are available at prices 
that are at least actuarially fair. This suggests that the limited benefits in purchased policies reflect a lack 
of demand for more comprehensive policies, rather than a market failure in their supply.   
This paper proceeds as follows:  In section 1, we show how information on the pricing and 
comprehensiveness of policies can be used to distinguish demand-side explanations for the market’s small 
size from explanations routed in supply-side market failures. Section 2 provides descriptive statistics on 
the structure and pricing of long-term care insurance policies. We develop our analytical framework for 
measuring pricing loads and benefit comprehensiveness in section 3, and the data for implementing these 
approaches are described in section 4.  In section 5, we provide our central empirical estimates of loads  
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and comprehensiveness of typical policies purchased. In section 6, we provide evidence suggesting that, 
despite the existence of supply side imperfections, the limited market size is not driven primarily by these 
supply side factors.  Section 7 concludes. 
1.  Theories of Limited Market Size 
A variety of theoretical explanations have been proposed to explain the extremely limited proportion 
of the elderly who purchase private long-term care insurance market (see Sloan and Norton, 1997 or 
Norton, 2000 for a detailed review of this literature).  These theories can be broadly classified into two 
categories: factors that limit the demand for private insurance, and supply side limitations to the market.   
On the demand side, problems of limited consumer rationality may limit demand for private long-
term care insurance. For example, individuals may have difficulty understanding low-probability, high-
loss events (see e.g. Kunreuther, 1978), or may simply avoid having to think about the unpleasant 
possibility of ending up in a nursing home.  Another major factor that may limit demand for private long-
term care insurance is the availability of imperfect but cheaper substitutes. These may come in the form of 
government assistance (e.g., the Medicaid program), financial transfers from children, or unpaid care 
provided directly by family members in lieu of formal paid care (Pauly, 1990). These are all likely to be 
imperfect substitutes for comprehensive private insurance. For example, Medicaid’s income and asset 
eligibility requirements place substantial restrictions on individuals’ abilities to smooth consumption over 
time and across states of care, as well as to bequeath upon death, and thus provides only limited 
consumption smoothing benefits (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004). Nevertheless, an imperfect but publicly- 
or family-funded source of long-term care insurance has the potential to substantially reduce demand for 
private insurance coverage. Pauly (1989, 1990) provides a stylized model that demonstrates this 
theoretical possibility.  
On the supply side, four market problems have been suggested as potential explanations for the small 
size of the market. Three are problems that may be common to many insurance markets: high transactions 
costs, imperfect competition, and asymmetric information (either adverse selection or moral hazard). The  
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fourth – the uninsured aggregate risk of rising long-term care costs – is specific to insurance markets with 
an undiversifiable component to the risk.  
The focus of this paper is to distinguish at a broad level whether the limited market size is due 
primarily to demand side or supply side explanations.  Rather than test each of the individual hypotheses 
separately, our approach is motivated by the observation that each of these four supply-side problems has 
at least one of two empirical implications.  First, the price of private insurance will substantially exceed 
actuarially fair levels.  Second, policies will be quantity-rationed through some form of benefit limitation.  
In other words, individuals may be willing to purchase more comprehensive policies at existing loads, but 
such policies are not offered.
1     
Transactions costs may stem from the unavoidable costs of insurance sales and claim processing. 
They may be exacerbated by imperfection competition (e.g., a form of X-inefficiency) or by the cost of 
gathering and verifying detailed health information at the time of purchase or time of claim in order to try 
to reduce any information asymmetries.  While both transaction costs and imperfect competition may – by 
raising prices – reduce the quantity of insurance demanded in equilibrium, neither will produce quantity 
rationing per se.  
Asymmetric information – in the form of either adverse selection or moral hazard – may produce 
quantity rationing. This quantity rationing may take the form of an unraveling of the insurance market so 
that policies are not offered (e.g. Akerlof, 1970). Or it may be on the intensive margin through the use the 
use of co-payments and deductibles that limit the amount of insurance provided (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976). In addition, if the population of insured individuals is above-average risk relative to the general 
population, asymmetric information will raise the price of insurance above the actuarially fair price for 
the population as a whole. 
Finally, Cutler (1996) has argued that a substantial component of long-term care expenditure risk is 
the intertemporal aggregate risk of increased long-term care costs.  This cannot be diversified through the 
                                                 
1 Naturally, anything that raises prices above actuarially fair levels may contribute to an equilibrium with limited 
quantities, but we reserve the term “quantity rationing” to situations in which individuals demand more 
comprehensive benefits at existing prices but such policies are not available in the market.  
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traditional insurance approach of pooling idiosyncratic risks because, if medical costs rise, it will affect 
the entire insurance pool. The presence of aggregate risk may therefore raise premiums because 
companies charge a “risk premium” in order to be compensated for bearing this aggregate risk (Froot, 
1999).  Alternatively, insurance companies may instead limit policies to cover only the idiosyncratic risk 
– for example by capping the dollar amount of payment per day in care – which is thus a form of quantity 
rationing (Cutler, 1996).   
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the extent to which these supply-side market 
imperfections are relevant by examining the pricing and benefit comprehensiveness of policies that are 
currently available in the market.  Doing so allows a first opportunity to assess the importance of these 
factors in limiting market size.   
2. Descriptive Statistics on the Long-Term Care Insurance Market 
Before developing a formal analytical framework for estimating pricing and comprehensiveness, we 
present some descriptive statistics on the long-term care insurance market and the structure and pricing of 
long-term care insurance policies. 
2.1 Who has private long-term care insurance? 
Table 1 presents statistics on private long-term care insurance ownership rates among individuals 
aged 60 and over from the 2000 Health and Retirement Survey. Only about 10 percent of the elderly have 
private long-term care insurance. Coverage rates are similar for men and women, slightly higher for 
married than single individuals, and increase substantially with asset levels. These basic findings appear 
in many other data sources as well (e.g. HIAA, 2000a and Cohen, forthcoming).  Data from a survey of 
long-term care insurance buyers indicate that most purchasers are elderly; among individuals aged 55 and 
older, the average age of buyers in 2000 was 67, and one-fifth were 75 or older (HIAA, 2000a).  
In contrast to the market for health insurance for acute medical expenditures, the vast majority (about 
80 percent) of private long-term care insurance contracts are sold through the individual (non-group  
  7
market).
2 We therefore focus in this paper on the non-group market; all subsequent statistics refer 
exclusively to this market. The market first began in the early 1980s (HIAA, 2001), but for a long time 
was extraordinarily small. By 2001, annualized in force premiums collected had reached $5.3 billion  
(LIMRA, 2001). 
2.2 The structure of private long-term care insurance contracts 
Table 2 presents information on the characteristics of typical policies purchased in 2000. All of these 
policies are written for an individual; in the long-term care insurance market, one cannot buy a “joint” 
policy to insure both members of the couple.  
Over three-fourths of private policies purchased are designed to cover all forms of long-term care, 
including expenditures on home care as well as nursing homes, although it is possible to purchase a 
policy that only covers facility based care or only home based care. Most policies also have a deductible, 
known as the “elimination period,” that specifies the number of days the individual must be receiving care 
before benefit payments can begin; approximately 70 percent of policies had deductibles of 30 to 100 
days.  Policies also specify a maximum “benefit period” which limits the total number of days the 
individual may receive benefits for care expenditures during the lifetime of the policy. Limits of 1-5 years 
are often specified, although almost one-third of all policies have unlimited (i.e. “lifetime”) benefit 
durations.  Another important feature of the policy is whether the benefits are fixed or escalating at a pre-
set amount (such as 3 or 5 percent) in nominal terms; about 40% of policies sold in 2000 had this 
escalation feature (see Table 2).
3  
A feature of private long-term care insurance policies that distinguishes them from the typical health 
insurance policy is the use of a maximum daily benefit.  Specifically, long-term care insurance policies 
typically pay either a fixed dollar amount per day in care, or reimburse costs up to a maximum daily 
benefit cap.  The average maximum daily benefit purchased for nursing home care in 2000 was $109; the 
modal benefit was $100.  
                                                 
2 The remaining share are sold through employer-sponsored plans or life insurance (HIAA 2000b). 
3  This is termed by the industry “inflation protection” although the nomenclature is misleading. Almost none are 
actually linked to the CPI (Weiss, 2002).  
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Finally, for care to be eligible for reimbursement, most private long term care policies require that the 
individual using the care must satisfy certain health-related criteria known as “benefit triggers.” About 90 
percent of recent sales are for policies that use the benefit triggers required by the 1996 Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for a plan to be eligible for tax benefits. These benefit 
triggers require that the individual must either need substantial assistance in performing at least 2 out of 6 
specified activities of daily living and assistance must be expected to last at least 90 days, or the 
individual requires substantial supervision due to severe cognitive impairment (Wiener et al., 2000; 
LIMRA, 2002; Lewis et al., 2003). These benefit triggers ensure that any covered care is for a chronic 
condition (rather than for acute rehabilitative care that Medicare or private health insurance would 
otherwise pay for).   
2.3 The pricing of long-term care insurance contracts 
To gain insight into the pricing of these policies, we purchased market-wide data on premiums for 
non-group long-term care insurance policies in 2002. These data were collected in March 2002 by Weiss 
Ratings, Inc, in their annual survey of all known companies in the United States that sell long-term care 
insurance. The responding companies include, among others, all of the top five sellers of long-term care 
insurance policies; these sellers alone account for two-thirds of industry sales (LIMRA, 2002).  
All long-term care insurance policy premiums are paid on a periodic (usually annual) basis and are 
pre-specified at a constant, nominal amount. At purchase, premiums tend to vary only with age, and with 
one of three broad, health-related rate categories: preferred, standard or extra-risk. The majority of buyers 
tend to quality for the standard rate (ALCI, 2001; Weiss, 2002).   
Policies are guaranteed renewable and are not experience rated for the individual if he experiences a 
change in health. However, premiums can be raised for a class of individuals, such as all those holding a 
particular type of policy or all those above a certain age (AARP, 2002; ACLI, 2001). Thus individuals 
face some risk of premium increases in the future.  Indeed, rate increases have been common in the past 
(AARP, 2002).   
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The market has traditionally been largely unregulated. Recently, however, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has enacted stringent new model regulations – and many states have 
adopted them – to ensure that rates are set to avoid future premium increases on whole block of business 
(NAIC, 2002a; NAIC, 2002b; Lewis et al., 2003). To the extent that these regulations are not fully 
successful at stabilizing rates, thus leaving some risk of future premium increases, the loads we estimate 
understate the ultimate cost of the policy.   
Weiss asks each company to report the “standard” premium for four common policy “scenarios” 
which they choose to be representative of the entire range of products available. These four scenarios are 
summarized in Table 3. They are labeled scenarios 1 through 4 in order of increasing benefit generosity. 
All policies pay a $100 maximum daily benefit and all cover facility care (i.e. nursing home care and 
assisted living facilities). All scenarios except the least generous cover home care. They differ in terms of 
their deductible, and their maximum benefit period. For each scenario, Weiss reports premiums for 
policies that have a constant maximum daily benefit of $100 per day, and policies whose maximum daily 
benefit starts at $100 but escalates at 5% per year in nominal terms. The data on policy purchases in Table 
2 indicate that the typical policy purchased is likely to be a constant nominal benefit policy with benefits 
somewhat less comprehensive than those in scenario 2.
4  
Table 4 presents descriptive information on annual median premiums in 2002 for each of the four 
scenarios in the Weiss data.  For all ages below 85 and all scenarios except scenario 4, the sample 
includes at least 8 policies.
5 All policies in the sample use the HIPPA-specified benefit triggers discussed 
above.  Prices are not reported by gender because insurance companies do not offer different prices by 
gender (Society of Actuaries, 2002). This is somewhat puzzling, given the large differences in expected 
long-term care expenditures between men and women and the absence of regulatory restrictions 
                                                 
4 A limitation to the data in Table 2 is that they do not permit cross-tabulations by policy characteristic. However, 
we also examined over 15,000 non-group policies sold to individuals aged 64 to 66 in 2000 or 2001 by one of the 
top five long-term care insurance companies and reached a similar conclusion. 
5 The Weiss data include a larger sample of companies offering similar policies but we excluded policies when 
slight differences in policy structure (e.g., different benefit triggers) would make the estimates of loads non-
comparable.  The smaller sample size for Scenario 4 is not due to limited availability of these policies per se, but 
rather that Weiss gave the companies a choice to report either Scenario 3 or Scenario 4.   
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prohibiting gender-based pricing. More generally, it relates to a broader puzzle in many insurance markets 
are of why firms do not use available information about expected utilization in pricing insurance (see e.g. 
Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002). 
For a medium-generosity policy, such as a Scenario 2 policy covering all types of care with a 60-day 
deductible, a 4-year benefit period, and a $100 maximum daily benefit, a 65-year old would pay nearly 
$1,200 annually for a policy with constant nominal benefits. The same policy costs over $2,100 if the 
maximum daily benefit escalates at a nominal rate of 5% per year.  Premiums rise sharply with age, with 
over a ten-fold premium increase from age 50 to age 85.  
Substantial price dispersion across companies is a common feature of many insurance markets, 
including automobile insurance (e.g. Dahlby and West, 1986), life insurance (e.g. Brown and Goolsbee, 
2002) and annuities (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1999). Such price dispersion is also evident in the long-term care 
insurance market. For example, for the constant nominal benefit, Scenario 2 policy for a 65 year old 
discussed above, annual premiums range from a low of $1,016 to a high of $2,010 (not shown). While 
statistics on offer prices may overstate the amount of actual price dispersion if very little business is 
transacted at the high-end of the pricing distribution, we show below that our estimates of the load are 
very similar if we restrict our analysis to the top 5 companies.  
3. Analytical Framework for Estimating Loads and Comprehensiveness 
We define the load, or price, on an insurance contract as the difference between unity and the ratio of 
the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of benefits to the EPDV of premiums.
6 The higher the 
load, the lower the expected return for the premium; an actuarially fair policy has a load of 0. 
The load for a simple policy with no deductible and an unlimited benefit period is therefore given by: 
                                                 
6 Our definition of the load is closely related to the “money’s worth” concept that has been widely used in other 
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While equation (1) omits deductibles and maximum benefit periods from the formula for notational 
simplicity, we account for such features when calculating the loads for actual policies below. All financial 
inputs are specified in nominal terms. The index t denotes calendar time in monthly increments, with 
purchase occurring at t=0. The index s denotes the state of care that the individual is in; we allow for five 
states of care: 1) receiving no paid care, 2) receiving paid home care, 3) residing in an assisted living 
facility, 4) residing in a nursing home, and 5) dead. The middle three states involve long-term care 
expenditures.  s t Q ,  denotes the probability of being in health state s at time t, given that the individual was 
out of care at the age of purchase (a requirement of most policies).
7   
Because a typical insurance policy reimburses covered per-period care expenditures  ) ( ,s t X  up to a 
maximum per-period benefit amount  ) ( ,s t B , the per-period benefits are  { } , , , , min s t s t B X .  i denotes the 
nominal short-term interest rate used to discount from period t back to period t-1 (with i0 = 0). Ps  denotes 
the per-period, nominal long-term care insurance premium. These premiums vary with the state of care (s)  
since an individual does not pay premiums when receiving benefits, but are constant over time in nominal 
terms.  
The comprehensiveness of a policy is defined similarly as the ratio of the expected present discounted 
value of benefits from a policy to the ratio of the EPDV of total insurable care expenditures for which the 
individual is at risk. As with the formula for the load, we present the formula for comprehensiveness for a 
                                                 
7 In practice, we use age- and gender-specific care utilization probabilities but for notational simplicity we have 
suppressed the gender subscript and use calendar time t to reflect the aging of the individual.  
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policy with no deductible and an unlimited benefit period for notational simplicity, but fully account for 


































































iveness Comprehens       (2) 
The policy comprehensiveness thus captures the expected share of long-term care expenditures that the 
policy will cover. 
It is worth noting at this point how the public insurance programs Medicare and Medicaid affect 
estimates of the policy’s comprehensiveness and load. Medicaid is the public health insurance program 
for the indigent and pays for 35% long-term care expenditures (CBO, 2004). However, it is a secondary 
payer; therefore, if the individual has private long-term care insurance, the private policy pays whatever 
benefits it owes before Medicaid makes any payments. It thus does not affect estimation of benefit 
comprehensiveness or load. Put differently, the load provides a measure of the net and gross expected 
return on the policy to the insurance company, but only the gross return on the policy to the individual. 
The net return to the individual will therefore be lower than the gross return to the extent that the policy 
premium pays for benefits that would otherwise have been covered by Medicaid. 
Medicare is the public health insurance program for the elderly. Because it is a primary payer, any 
care that is eligible for Medicare is not reimbursed by private insurance and is not included in our 
estimate of per-period care expenditures  ) ( ,s t X . Medicare pays for 16% of institutional care (specifically, 
nursing home care) and 30% of home health care for the elderly (U.S. Congress, 2000).  However, 
because very little of Medicare-covered nursing home expenditures would be otherwise eligible for 
private long-term care insurance benefits, we do not incorporate Medicare’s nursing home benefits into  
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our estimation of comprehensiveness or of loads, which are based on insurable expenses.
8 Medicare 
coverage for home health care, by contrast, pays for services that would otherwise be eligible for private 
insurance coverage. We therefore take account of Medicare in estimating policy loads and 
comprehensiveness; the details are discussed in Section 4.2 below.  
4. Data Sources 
We use the 2002 Weiss data described above for information on premiums  ) ( ,s t P and benefits  ) ( ,s t B . 
This section describes the data for the remainder of the necessary inputs. 
4.1 Data on care utilization  ) ( ,s t Q  
One of the most important inputs for our analysis is the distribution of long-term care utilization risk. 
We require information not only on nursing home utilization – for which there currently exist many 
published studies (e.g. Dick et al., 1994; Kemper and Murtaugh, 1991; Murtaugh et al. 1997) – but also 
information on utilization of assisted living facilities and home health care, both of which are covered by 
most policies.  We also need to be able to distinguish across types of individuals and types of care 
utilization in the same manner as private insurance companies. Individuals tend to be denied non-group 
long-term care insurance policies if they have any limitations to activities of daily living (ADLs) or any 
cognitive impairment at the time of purchase (Murtaugh et al., 1995; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2003). In 
addition, as noted earlier, long-term care insurance policies specify health conditions (known as “benefit 
triggers”) that must be satisfied in order for the individual to be eligible to receive benefits for care 
covered by the policy. To meet all of these requirements, we makes use of a “state of the art” model of 
health and institutional transitions that was developed and provided to us by Jim Robinson, an actuary and 
former member of the Society of Actuaries’ long-term care insurance valuation methods task force 
                                                 
8 Medicare will cover nursing home stays only if: (1) they are stays in skilled nursing home days and (2) follow 
within 30 days a hospital discharge. Medicare will only cover up to 100 days per spell of illness. Beyond 20 days, 
Medicare requires a co-payment of $97 in 2000 (U.S. Congress, 2000); this is approximately equal to the $100 
benefit cap. Finally, the criteria for Medicare coverage results in Medicare covering mostly stays that are for 
recovery from acute illness; by contrast, as discussed earlier, long-term care insurance benefit triggers require that 
there be little likelihood of recovery within 90 days (U.S. Congress, 2000).   
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(Society of Actuaries, 1996).  The model has two components.
9 The first uses data from the 1982, 1984, 
1989 and 1994 National Long Term Care Surveys to estimate transition probabilities across seven 
different health states, defined by the number of limitations to activities of daily living (ADLs) and 
limitations to instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), the presence or absence of cognitive 
impairment, and death. The transition model is based on a Continuous-Time Markov Chain that allows 
the transition rates to vary with the sex and the age of the individual. The second component uses the 
1985 National Nursing Home Survey as well as the National Long Term Care Surveys to estimate the 
probability that individuals are in each of the five care states (no care, home care, assisted living, nursing 
home, or death) as a function of age, gender, current health status, and the length of time in the health 
status.  
Together, this information can be combined to produce Markov transition probabilities across care 
states. The model also produces estimates of the number of hours of skilled home care and unskilled 
home care provided during a home care episode.  Because the model provides information not only on the 
transitions across care states but also across the number of ADLs and IADLs and the presence or absence 
of cognitive impairment, we can construct transition probabilities specifically for individuals who are, at 
the time of purchase, healthy enough to be eligible for insurance.  We can also identify which care 
episodes satisfy the benefit triggers built into most policies.   
The estimates produced by the model are designed to be representative of the entire population. We 
do not make any adjustments to reflect the possibility that moral hazard or adverse selection may result in 
an insured population with different rates of care utilization than non-insured individuals.  This is because 
the utilization experience of insured individuals is quite similar to that of the population as a whole 
(Society of Actuaries, 2002; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2003).  Thus, these estimates are representative of 
the insured population as well. 
The estimates do not incorporate any projected changes in morbidity or care utilization.  This is 
standard practice for the industry (see e.g. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002, and conversations with 
                                                 
9 Readers interested in a more detailed description of the model are encouraged to consult Robinson (1996).  
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several actuaries) as well as for academic research (e.g. Wiener et al., 1994). This practice may reflect the 
substantial disagreement in the literature over the sign of projected changes in morbidity (compare e.g. 
Manton et al., 1997 and Manton and Gu, 2001 to Lakdawalla et al., 2001) or in care utilization 
conditional on morbidity (compare e.g. Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002 to CBO, 1999).  
The model has a very strong pedigree. Versions of the model have been used by insurance regulators, 
private insurance companies, state agencies administering public long-term care benefit programs, and the 
Society of Actuaries LTC Valuation Methods Task Force (Robinson, 2002). We spoke with numerous 
actuaries in consulting firms, insurance companies, and the Society of Actuaries who confirmed that the 
model is widely used to price long-term care insurance policies and that it is very highly regarded.  We 
also independently verified that the model produces estimates that are broadly consistent with published 
estimates, where comparable; Appendix Table A summarizes the results of this validation exercise.  
Table 5 presents some summary statistics on care utilization in the Robinson model for 65-year old 
men and women. To make the statistics relevant for someone’s long-term care insurance policy, the 
statistics assume the individual is medically eligible for insurance at age 65 and counts care utilization 
only if benefit triggers are satisfied. A 65-year old man has a 27 percent chance of ever using nursing 
home care; a 65 year old woman has a 44 percent chance of ever using nursing home care. Among those 
who use care, the amount of care used is also higher for women. For example, women who enter a 
nursing home spend on average 2 years there and have a 12 percent chance of spending more than 5 years 
there; for men who enter a nursing home, the average amount of time spent there is 1.3 years, and they 
have only a 5 percent chance of spending more than 5 years there. These gender differences in utilization 
are only partially explained by longevity differences.
10  They likely also reflect the fact that elderly men 
are more likely than elderly women to receive unpaid care from their spouses in lieu of formal, paid care 
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002) as well as underlying health differences between men and women. 
                                                 
10 For example, among individuals who survive until age 80, women have a 10 percent change of having used 
nursing home care before age 80, compared to only 7 percent for men (results not shown).  
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There is substantial churning across types of care as well as exit from care for reasons other than 
death. For example, a man who uses a nursing home has a 55% chance of also using home health care 
(results not shown). In addition, almost two-thirds of individuals who use a nursing home will at some 
point leave the nursing home alive; this is consistent with other studies (e.g. Dick et al., 1994) that 
indicate a substantial amount of recovery from nursing home care.  On the other hand, we find that about 
half of individuals who use a nursing home will ultimately die in a nursing home (results not shown).  
4.2 Other inputs 
Data on average national daily care costs for nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and home health 
care  ) ( ,s t X  are taken from Metlife Market Survey data (MetLife, 2002a; MetLife, 2002b). These data 
were collected in order to determine pricing for the new federal long-term care insurance program. The 
survey covers all 50 states and the District of Columbia. We use the national average costs because 
insurance companies do not vary premiums with location.  In addition, using a restricted access version of 
the 2000 Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) that includes each individual’s state of residence, we 
found no evidence of a statistically or substantively significant correlation between the average daily 
nursing home cost in the state and the probability of holding long-term care insurance. 
The national average daily cost of nursing home care in 2002 is $143 per day for a semi-private room 
(private rooms are more expensive). Care costs for an assisted living facility are on average about half 
that, at $72 per day. Home health care is by far the least expensive type of care, and accounts for only 
one-quarter of total long-term care expenditures (U.S. Congress, 2000). Using the data on hours of home 
health care use described above, we estimate that even a current 90 year old male (female) in home health 
care would only incur, on average, $30 ($45) per day of insurable home health care costs. Moreover, we 
adjust home health care expenditures downward in estimating equations (1) and (2) to account for the fact 
that Medicare pays an estimated 35% of home health care costs.
11 
                                                 
11 Our estimate of 35% is based on the fact that Medicare covers 30% of home health care expenditures (U.S. 
Congress, 2000), and our estimate from the Robinson data that 85% of total home health care expenditures meet the 
private benefit trigger.   Since the health-related criteria for Medicare eligibility are more stringent than those for  
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We project forward these estimates of 2002 long-term care costs using the general consensus that, 
since the primary cost for all of these types of care is the labor input, they will grow at the rate of real 
wage growth (Wiener et al., 1994, and conversations with industry officials).
12 We use the Wiener et al. 
(1994) and Abt (2001) assumption of 1.5 percentage point annual real growth in care costs, although we 
also examine the sensitivity of our findings to both lower and higher assumptions about real cost growth.  
To put cost growth into nominal terms, we apply expected rates of inflation as of March 2002, the 
date of the survey.  The expected inflation rate is determined using the yield differential between nominal 
U.S. Treasury securities and TIPS.  For our nominal interest rates ( t i ), we use the term structure on yields 
of U.S. Treasury strips from this same date. In the analysis below we examine the sensitivity of our 
findings to using the corporate term structure instead of the Treasury term structure for discounting.   
5. Estimates of Loads and Benefit Comprehensiveness of Typical Purchased Policies 
5.1 Basic results 
Table 6 reports the estimated load and comprehensiveness of the typical policy purchased by a 65 
year old.  Relating back to Table 3, this is a “scenario 2” policy with $100 constant nominal daily 
benefits, covering all three types of long-term care with a 60 day deductible and a 4 year maximum 
benefit period. The results are shown using a unisex actuarial table because policies are sold on a unisex 
basis.  
The first row shows the results using the “base case” assumptions discussed above. Under these 
assumptions, the typical policy purchased by a 65 year old has a load of 0.18. This indicates that a 65 year 
old who purchases this policy receives, in expectation, only 82 cents in expected present discounted 
benefits for every dollar he pays in expected present discounted value premiums.   
                                                                                                                                                             
“tax qualified” private insurance (see e.g. Bishop and Skwara, 1993; GAO, 1996; U.S. Congress 2000), we assume 
that all Medicare home health care payments are for home health care that meets the private policy benefit triggers. 
12 The image of an individual in a nursing home hooked up to many machines is in fact a tiny share of the nursing 
home population. As Wiener et al. (1994) note, “long-term care is extremely labor intensive, and much of it involves 
hands-on, personal services, where opportunities for substantial gains in productivity are few.”  
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It is surprisingly difficult to find estimates of loads in other insurance markets. However we were able 
to compare our 18 percent load estimate for long-term care insurance policies to estimates of loads on life 
annuities and on acute health insurance. The load for long-term care insurance is roughly comparable to 
that found for life annuities which, for 65 year olds are in the range of 13 to 15 percent (Brown, Mitchell 
and Poterba, 2002). Like long-term care insurance, life annuities are also sold by life insurance companies 
to elderly consumers and are a relatively small market. The long-term care insurance load is higher than 
the typical loads on acute health insurance, which is a much more substantial market; these are on the 
order of 6 to 10 percent (Newhouse, 2002).
13  
The second column of Table 6 indicates that the typical policy purchased by a 65 year old will cover 
only about one-third (34 percent) of the individual’s expected present discounted value of long-term care 
expenditures. The limited coverage is due primarily to the presence of the $100 constant nominal daily 
benefit cap rather than to the 60-day deductible or 4-year maximum benefit period.  For example, if we 
re-estimate the comprehensiveness eliminating the deductible and maximum benefit period, the 
comprehensiveness increases by only 44 percent (to 49 percent, results not shown). By contrast, if we 
keep the deductible and maximum benefit period but remove the daily benefit cap so that all insurable 
expenditures are reimbursed, the comprehensiveness increases by 100 percent (to 68 percent, results not 
shown). This is because, at $143 per day for a semi-private room, current nursing home costs already 
exceed the $100 daily benefit cap. Moreover, a 65 year old who purchases a policy now and eventually 
enters a nursing home will not, on average, enter that nursing home for 18.5 years (see Table 5); by that 
time, the $100 daily benefit cap will cover only one-third of his daily nursing home costs. 
5.2 Results under alternative assumptions 
  The remaining rows of Table 6 show the estimates for the load and comprehensiveness under 
alternative assumptions.  The first alternative shows the effect of using the higher term structure for BAA 
corporate bonds instead of U.S. Treasury strips.  Not surprisingly, this increases the load (from 0.18 to 
                                                 
13 This is the estimate of the load on group health insurance. Loads on non-group health insurance can be as high as 
25 to 40 percent, but the vast majority of acute health insurance policies sold are group policies (Newhouse, 2002).  
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0.27) because premium payments begin almost immediately while benefits do not begin, on average, for 
another 15 to 20 years. Comprehensiveness also increases (but only slightly from 0.34 to 0.36); the ratio 
of insured to total expenditures is higher in more heavily weighted earlier years, reflecting both the 
limited benefit period and the fact that the fixed nominal daily benefit cap covers a declining fraction of 
expenditures over time. The next two rows vary the real cost growth rate from the base case of 1.5 percent 
to 3 percent (the assumption used by Mulvey and Li, 2002 and CBO, 1999) and 0.75 percent (the “lower 
bound” assumption used by Abt, 2001). As expected, higher real cost growth results in lower loads but 
also lower comprehensiveness while lower real cost growth results in higher loads and higher 
comprehensiveness.  The effect on loads is tempered however, by the presence of the $100 constant 
nominal benefit cap since cost growth above the cap does not affect the load estimates.  
Given the large documented price dispersion in other insurance markets, we also estimated loads 
based on the median premium for the policy offered by the top five sellers of long-term care insurance. 
Table 6 shows that the load is essentially the same for this more limited sample.  
The next two rows consider the effect of a “spousal discount” on loads. Insurance companies do not 
offer long-term care insurance policies that jointly cover a husband and wife. However, many companies 
provide discounts on the premium if both members of the couple purchase a policy. Spousal discounts of 
10 percent are common in the Weiss data. We estimate in the 2000 Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 
that about two-fifths of policies are held in households where both spouses are covered.
14 Under the 
generous assumption that all of these policies receive a spousal discount, the 10 percent spousal discount 
reduces the average load to 0.14.  
The loads presented thus far are calculated from the perspective of an individual who buys a policy 
and pays premiums until death. In practice, however, about 7 percent of policies each year lapse due to 
failure to pay the regularly scheduled premiums within the time required; lapse rates are similar for both 
genders (Society of Actuaries, 2002). This lapse rate will have a substantial impact on the estimated load 
                                                 
14 This number is not artificially low due to possibility that there was a two-owner married couple in which one 
spouse has died. In the 2000 HRS, we estimate that of currently married households in which at least one spouse has 
insurance, 60 percent of these households have only one spouse holding insurance.    
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because in the early years of the policy expected premium payments are substantially higher than 
expected benefits; on average, it is only after 15 to 20 years that individuals begin receiving benefits. 
Moreover, lapse activity usually results in the forfeiture of any future benefits; fewer than 3 percent of the 
policies in the Weiss data provide any benefits after a policy lapses. In the last row of table 6, therefore, 
we estimate the load assuming that the individual faces the insured-population average probability of 
lapsing each year.
15  Accounting for this lapse activity raises the estimate of the load to 0.51, almost a 3-
fold increase over the base case.   
The reasons for these policy lapses are not well understood. An industry survey of individuals who 
had lapsed from their existing long-term care insurance policies found that the most common explanation 
given for this lapsation was an “affordability problem”; most individuals who let their policy lapse do not 
subsequently buy a new policy (HIAA, 1993). Dynamic selection – as insured individuals learn more 
about their expected care utilization – may also be part of the explanation for lapsation. There is evidence 
that individuals who let their long-term care insurance contract lapse have, ex-post, a lower risk if nursing 
home use than individuals who were otherwise-equivalent at the time of purchase who do not drop out of 
their contracts (Finkelstein et al., 2004).   
5.3 Where does the load come from? 
As noted earlier, loads on private insurance products may be produced by administrative costs, 
imperfect competition, asymmetric information and aggregate risk. If the estimated long-term care 
insurance load was due primarily to the aggregate risk of medical cost inflation or increased care 
utilization, we should expect to see loads decreasing with age.  This is because at older ages, the 
remaining time horizon for care – and hence the risk of an aggregate shock – is smaller.  Figure 1 
however indicates that loads rise with age, suggesting that the explanation for high loads lies elsewhere.  
While inconsistent with aggregate risk, this age-load pattern is consistent with individuals having private 
information about risk type that increases with age.  Indeed, recent empirical evidence indicates that 
                                                 
15 Data on lapse rates for non-group policies come from the Society of Actuaries (2002). It is possible that these data 
may overstate lapse rates as terminations for unknown reasons (which may include death) are counted as a lapse.  
However, a survey on this issue indicates that less than 10% of recorded lapses may in fact be deaths (HIAA, 1993).  
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asymmetric information exists in the private long-term care insurance market. However, asymmetric 
information is unlikely to contribute to the baseline loads, as the average utilization of insured individuals 
is similar to the utilization of the population as a whole (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2003).
16 
By contrast, administrative costs are likely to contribute to the loads. Indeed, it is unrealistic to 
presume that an insurance company will be able to price insurance in an actuarially fair manner, as they 
must cover their expenses (including commissions for agents and brokers) and earn a normal profit in 
order to stay in business over the long run.  Estimates of administrative costs in the health insurance 
industry as a whole vary from as low as 15 percent (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2004), to as high as 40 
percent for individual / small group policies (Council of Economic Advisers, 1994), and vary widely by 
lines of insurance and by company (Mulligan and Philipson, 2003). Unfortunately, we have been unable 
to find reliable estimates of administrative costs for long-term care insurance.  
Imperfect competition is also a likely contributor to the estimated loads. While markets for financial 
products such as insurance are generally thought to be fairly competitive, analysis of the U.S. life 
insurance industry suggests that it may be less efficient than other financial services industries such as 
property-liability insurance and banking, and that price competition is relatively low (Cummins, 1999).  
Moreover, the market for long-term care insurance is fairly concentrated. The top company (G.E.) 
accounts for one-quarter of market sales and the top five companies account for two-thirds of the market 
(LIMRA, 2002).  On net, therefore, the evidence suggests that the existing loads arise from a combination 
of administrative costs and imperfect competition, although it is not possible to distinguish the relative 
contribution of the two using currently available data.   
6. Can Supply Side Problems Explain the Limited Private Market? 
The preceding results indicate that most policies purchased in the private market are priced well in 
excess of actuarially fair levels and they provide only very limited coverage. In this section, we 
                                                 
16 Although individuals who have private information that they are higher risk are more likely to purchase insurance, 
another group of individuals that tends to purchase insurance are unobservably more “cautious” about their health 
and are lower risk than the insurance company would estimate. These two factors cancel each other out and produce 
an insured population that, on average, has a similar risk profile to the population as a whole (Finkelstein and 
McGarry, 2003).  
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investigate whether the high loads and limited benefits – and implicitly, the private market problems that 
may be behind them – appear to be important factors in explaining the limited proportion of people who 
buy private policies and the limited amount of insurance bought by those who do buy these policies.  We 
provide several pieces of complementary evidence that suggests that this is not the case.  
6.1 Is pricing to blame? 
The results in Table 7 show a striking disparity in the loads by gender. This arises from the fact that 
premiums are offered on a unisex basis (see Table 4) whereas utilization rates are much higher for women 
(see Table 5). As a result, the base case estimates indicate that typical load for a 65 year-old male is 44 
cents on the dollar, which means that the typical male who purchases a long-term care insurance policy 
can expect to receive only 56 cents in benefits for every dollar spent in premiums. By contrast, the 
premiums are actually better than actuarially fair for the typical woman, with loads of -0.04.
17 In other 
words, a 65 year-old woman would receive $1.04 in EPDV benefits for every dollar paid in EPDV 
premiums.   
There are two related implications of these loads by gender, both of which suggest a limited role of 
pricing.  First, standard expected utility theory indicates that a risk averse individual will want to buy 
insurance (in fact, full insurance) if the premium is actuarially fair. The fact that only 10 percent of 
elderly women own long-term care insurance policies despite facing prices that are better than actuarially 
fair suggests that something other than pricing is constraining demand for private long-term are insurance.   
Second, coverage rates are similar for men and for women despite markedly different loads.  Despite 
the enormous differences in loads by gender estimated in Table 7, the probability of having insurance is 
approximately the same for men and for women (see Table 1). In addition, policies purchased by women 
tend to be very similar to those purchased by men. If anything, most differences tend to be in the direction 
of women purchasing slightly less comprehensive policies (shorter duration, lower daily benefit, etc), 
although these differences are not significant (see Table 2).   Clearly, there must be some other demand 
                                                 
17 Note that the average load using unisex pricing is not simply the equally weighted average of the load on a man’s 
and woman’s policies separately, because the unisex pricing approach implicitly places more weight on the woman, 
due to her higher rates of utilization and survival.    
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side factor that is altering the effective load for men and for women, or else one would expect the 
difference between a 44 percent load for men and a negative load for women would lead to differences in 
purchase propensities.  Even if one took the view that one must consider the probability of allowing a 
policy to lapse, in which case the load for women is now positive (see Table 7) and suggests actuarially 
unfair pricing, it is still the case that dramatically different load factors for men and women remain, but 
do not lead to different utilization probabilities.   
One alternative explanation for the similarity in coverage rates for men and women that is not related 
to price directly is that there may be high within-household correlation in coverage decisions. This does 
not, however, appear to be the case. In the 2000 HRS, for example, we found that in married households 
in which one spouse has purchased insurance, the probability that the other spouse purchases insurance is 
only 40 percent.
18 While this is considerably higher than the probability for any married individual (which 
is about 12 percent), it also indicates that many married individuals make different purchase decisions 
than their spouse. Since only about three-quarters of policies are held by married (as opposed to single) 
individuals, overall only about two-fifths of policies are held in households in which both spouses are 
covered.  
 6.2 Are quantities rationed? 
We found that the typical policy purchased contains very limited coverage. Various supply-side 
market failures could result in more comprehensive policies not being offered, even if individuals were 
willing to purchase them. Asymmetric information may produce such quantity-rationing as it may result 
in their being no equilibrium price for a particular policy (see e.g. Akerlof, 1970 or Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981).  Similarly, aggregate risk could lead to quantity rationing as a way of limiting the insurer’s 
exposure to the “right tail” of the expenditure distribution. 
In fact, we find no evidence of quantity rationing.  While typically purchased  policies provide 
limited benefits, the market currently offers substantially more comprehensive policies that are widely 
                                                 
18 Married households in which only one spouse has insurance are split basically 50-50 in terms of whether it is the 
husband or the wife that has insurance.  
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available at loads similar to those on less comprehensive policies.  Table 8 shows the estimated 
comprehensiveness and loads for a typical 65 year old for 8 different policies that, according to the Weiss 
data, are widely available. Moving down the rows, the policies are increasing in comprehensiveness. To 
conserve space, we report results under the base case assumptions only; in results not reported, we find 
that all of the patterns discussed below remain present under the various alternative assumptions from 
Table 6.   
The comprehensiveness estimates in Table 8 indicate that policies covering over 90 percent of the 
expected present value of long-term care expenditures are available in the market. The key to getting such 
a policy is to increase the daily benefit cap. Policies paying constant nominal benefits cover only between 
one-quarter and one-half of the expected present value of insurable long-term care expenditures for a 65-
year-old male or female. By contrast, these same policies cover substantially more (between one-half and 
almost all) of expenditures if they escalate at 5% per year in nominal terms.  The fact that such 
comprehensive policies are available indicates that supply-side market failures such as asymmetric 
information do not appear to prevent the offering of comprehensive insurance policies.
19  
A second key result in Table 8 is that the loads do not rise systematically with the comprehensiveness 
of the policy. For example, for women, loads for a given policy scenario are lower on the larger policy 
(i.e. escalating vs. constant nominal benefits); however, for a given benefit time-profile, loads tend to be 
higher on policy scenarios with more comprehensiveness benefits.
20  This lack of a clear pricing pattern 
by comprehensiveness is consistent with the utilization-based evidence in Finkelstein and McGarry 
(2003) that there are not systematic risk differences across individuals who purchase more or less 
comprehensive policies.   
                                                 
19 Of course, as noted by Cutler (1996), as a result of their daily benefit caps, none of these policies covers the 
aggregate risk of dramatically increased nursing home costs. It is unlikely, however, that daily benefit caps primarily 
represent a means of rationing insurance coverage against such aggregate risk. The data indicate that older buyers 
who – due to the greater proximity of purchase age with expected care use face less aggregate risk than younger 
buyers – not only purchase binding daily benefit caps but in fact purchase lower daily benefit amounts and are less 
likely to purchase policies with benefit escalation (HIAA 2000a). 
20 The sole exception is Scenario 4, which is likely an artifact of the much more limited set of companies in the data 
providing premium information on this policy. When we limit the sample to the companies who offer Scenario 4 and 
other scenarios, scenario 4 always has a higher load than the other scenarios.   
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The availability of more comprehensive policies at similar loads suggests that, while typically 
purchased policies are of limited comprehensiveness, it is not the case that supply side imperfections have 
led to quantity rationing and thus rendered comprehensive policies unavailable.  Rather, consumers are 
choosing not to buy more comprehensive policies, even though they are available at comparable loads to 
less comprehensive ones.  Nor is it the case that high loads simply limit demand more for more 
comprehensive policies. Were this true, we should see women purchasing more comprehensive policies 
than men. The data in Table 2 however suggest that, if anything, women purchase less comprehensive 
policies than men. Again, this points to the existence of demand-side factors that in some sense raise the 
effective load above that calculated here.   
There is, of course, a different form of quantity rationing that does exist in this market, namely, that 
individuals in observably poor health are often denied insurance coverage, at least by the large long-term 
care insurance companies (Murtaugh et al., 1995; Weiss, 2002). The practice of denying individuals 
rather than offering them higher prices is interesting given the absence of pricing regulation preventing 
the offering of high prices. It may reflect issues of reputation or brand name, or it may reflect private 
market failures such as asymmetric information which may be more of a problem for people in worse 
health. However, this limited type of quantity rationing is unlikely to be a major factor in explaining the 
small size of the private long-term care insurance market. An examination of applications from the major 
long-term care insurance companies – as well as several of their underwriting guides – indicates that they 
deny coverage to individuals who have limitations with respect to activities of daily livings (bathing, 
eating, dressing, toileting, walking, and maintaining continence), use of mechanical devices (wheelchair, 
walker, crutches, quad cane, oxygen) or suffer from cognitive impairment.  We estimate in the 2000 HRS 
that about 85 percent of individuals aged 60 to 70 would meet these eligibility requirements.
21  
In total, the evidence on pricing and benefit comprehensiveness leads to two findings.  First, that 
commonly purchased policies tend to be expensive and cover only a small fraction of overall long-term 
                                                 
21 Our estimate is comparable to that found by other investigators using different data and methods.  For example, 
Murtaugh et al. (1995) estimate that 12 to 23 percent of 65 year olds would be ineligible for insurance.  
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care expenditures.  Second, the existence of these high prices and limited benefit is insufficient to explain 
the small size of this market.  The evidence from prices and benefit availability relative to purchase 
behavior suggests that demand side factors are important in understanding the limited size of the market.  
7. Conclusion 
The limited size of the market for private long-term care insurance in the U.S. has spawned a number 
of theoretical papers exploring a variety of both demand- and supply-side explanations for the lack of 
widespread private long-term care insurance.  Yet very little evidence exists with which to answer even 
the most basic empirical questions about the nature of this market.  This paper brings to bear new 
evidence on the existing market for long term care insurance policies, and in so doing argues that supply 
side market limitations are not the primary reason for the small size of the market.   
The four major supply side hypotheses – administrative costs, imperfect competition, asymmetric 
information, and aggregate risk – all have at least one of two empirical implications.  First, prices should 
be higher than actuarially fair.  Second, available policies should be limited in their benefit 
comprehensiveness (“quantity rationing”).  We begin by showing that, based on the characteristics of 
commonly purchased policies, both of these empirical predictions appear to hold.  The typical policy 
purchased by a 65 year old has a load of 18 percent and covers only about one-third of expected long-
term care expenditures. 
However, we also provide evidence that neither of these factors appear capable of explaining the 
limited size of the market.  We find enormous differences in loads between men and women – our central 
estimates suggest the load on the typical policy purchased by a 65 year old man is 0.44, compared to -0.04 
for the typical 65 year old woman – yet virtually no difference in insurance coverage. We also find that 
more comprehensive policies are widely available at comparable loads to the more limited, purchased 
policies. This suggests that quantity rationing is not a primary factor in this market. 
  The results of this paper therefore imply that the limited size of the market is not driven by supply 
side imperfections, but rather demand side factors. Possible demand-side factors that have been suggested 
by the theoretical literature include limited consumer rationality and the existence of substitutes for  
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private insurance, such as informal care provided by family members or the public Medicaid program.  
Our results indicate that, to explain existing empirical patterns, a demand-side story must not simply 
reduce the desirability of insurance for everyone, but also be able to explain why men and women insure 
at a comparable rate, despite the very different load factors that they face in the private market.   
In this regard, one particularly promising demand-side explanation is the role of Medicaid. In separate 
work (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004) we have estimated that a large part of the premium for private 
insurance policies goes to pay for benefits that simply replace benefits that would otherwise have been 
provided by Medicaid.  Because women’s expected lifetime utilization of long-term care is much greater 
than men, women are even more likely than men to end up on Medicaid, with or without private 
insurance. As a result, the “implicit tax” that Medicaid imposes on private insurance policies is 
substantially larger for women than for men. We consider further explorations of Medicaid’s role in this 
market a very important avenue for additional research.  
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Table 1: 2000 Private long-term care insurance coverage rate among the elderly in the HRS 




Men Women  Married  Single 
1 2 3  4 
 
Long-term care 
insurance coverage rate 
10.5  10.7  10.1 11.8 8.4  2.8  5.9  11.5  19.4 
Note:  Sample consists of individuals in 2000 HRS aged 60 and over. Average age is 74. Sample size is 14,937. All 





Table 2: Characteristics of Individual Long-Term Care Insurance Policies Purchased in 2000 








TYPES OF POLICIES SOLD       
Nursing Home Only  14%  12%  16% 
Nursing Home and Home Health Care  77  80  74 
Home Health Care Only 
 
9 8  10 
DEDUCTIBLE        
0 days  23%  22%  24% 
15-20 days  3  2  3 
30-60 days  16  16  19 
90-100 days  55  59  51 
> 100 days  3  4  3 
 
NURSING HOME BENEFIT PERIOD 
    
1-2 years  17%  16%  19% 
3 years  23  23  22 
4 years  14  12  15 
5 years  11  12  10 
6 years  5  4  2 
Lifetime Benefit  30  34  32  
Average duration among Non-Lifetime Policies 
 
5.5 years  5.6 years  5.3 years 
PERCENT CHOOSING INFLATION PROTECTION 
 
41% 42%  41% 
NURSING HOME DAILY BENEFIT       
up to $30   1%  1%  1% 
$31-$59 5  5  6 
$60-$89 17  16  18 
$90-$119 43  42  44 
$120 and Over  34  36  31 
Source: LifePlans, Inc. survey of 5,407 policies purchased in 2000 based on a random sample of policies purchased by 
12 companies representing more than 80 percent of sales in 1999. Average age of the buyers is 67. First column is taken 
directly from HIAA (2000a). Estimates by gender are based on a custom tabulation done by LifePlans, Inc. at the 




Table 3: Description of common policy scenarios for which prices are listed in Weiss data 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
 
Covers Nursing Home  YES 
 
YES YES YES 





YES YES YES 





YES YES YES 
Deductible 
 
90 Day  60 day  30 days  0 days 
Benefit Period 
 
2 Year  4 year  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Daily  Benefit  $100 $100 $100 $100 
Note: Deductible specifies the number of days in otherwise-covered care during which no benefits are paid toward the 
policyholder’s expenses. Benefit period gives the maximum length of time for which the policy will pay the daily 
benefit. The daily benefit gives the maximum amount paid by the company per day toward covered care. In all of the 




Table 4: Descriptive statistics on annual median premiums in 2002 
  Age 50  Age 55  Age 60  Age 65  Age 70  Age 75  Age 80  Age 85 
          
Scenario 1:  
- Covers Facility Care only  
- 90 day deductible  
- 2 year benefit period 
        
    Constant Benefit  210 270 360 530 843  1,410  2,470  3,986 
    Escalating (5%)  447  558  752  1,016 1,470 2,218 3,320 4,846 
          
Scenario 2:  
- All care covered  
- 60 day deductible  
- 4 year benefit period 
        
    Constant Benefit  459  597  821  1,192 1,907 3,232 5,156 7,707 
    Escalating (5%)  1,032 1,271 1,572 2,140 3,268 5,038 7,565  10,189 
          
 
Scenario 3:  
- All care covered  
- 30 day deductible  
- Unlimited benefit period 
        
    Constant Benefit  751  912  1,280 1,872 3003 5,004 7,875  10,411 
    Escalating (5%)  1,630 1,910 2,490 3,450 5,112 7,843  11,930  13,857 
          
Scenario 4:  
- All care covered; 
- 0 day deductible; 
- Unlimited benefit period 
        
    Constant Benefit  602  843  1,147 1,698 2,616 4,345 8,290  10,071 
    Escalating (5%)  1,565 2,007 2,496 3,326 4,509 6,613  11,150  12,327 
          
Note:  “Premium” refers to median premium. All policies have $100 maximum daily benefit for any covered care. 
“Facility care” refers to nursing home and assisted living facilities. “All care” also includes home health care. All 
companies quote unisex prices.  Weiss requests information on three policy scenarios, with the third defined as either 
Scenario 3 or Scenario 4 (the company selects). The somewhat anomalous result that median premiums are lower for 
(more generous) Scenario 4 policies than (less generous) Scenario 3 policies arises from heterogeneity in the set of 
companies offering these different policies because of whether they chose to report Scenario 3 or Scenario 4. 
Comparisons of premiums across ages between 50 and 75 or between men and women are not subject to this difficulty 




Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Care Utilization for 65 year old, from Robinson Model 
   Probability  of  Use   
 
Duration of Use (Among Users)  Exit and reentry 
(among users) 
   Prob. 
Ever 
Use 
Prob. ever use, 
cond’l on living 
to 75 
Prob. ever use, 
cond’l on 


























0.49  0.59    84  2.0  0.42 0.12 0.66  1.39 





0.20  0.22  0.26    85 0.48 0.13 0.01 0.93  1.26 
Men  0.28  0.34  0.47    83  1.5  0.38 0.07 0.60  1.27  Facility Care 
(NH or ALF)  Women 0.46 
 
0.51  0.61    84  2.3  0.48 0.15 0.62  1.37 
Men  0.29  0.31  0.34    79  1.9  0.52 0.09 0.67  1.45  Home Care 
(HC)  Women 0.35 
 
0.37  0.39    81  2.3  0.52 0.15 0.77  1.68 
Men  0.40  0.46  0.55    80  2.9  0.77 0.17 0.33  1.20  Any Care (NH 
or ALF or 
HC) 
Women  0.54  0.59  0.68    82  4.2  0.85 0.31 0.35  1.27 
Note: All statistics are reported for the version of the model used for all of the analysis in the paper. Specifically, all individuals are assumed to be 
healthy enough to be eligible for private insurance at the time of purchase (here, age 65) and care utilization is measured as care utilization by 
individuals whose health characteristics simultaneously satisfy the benefit triggers required for care costs to be reimbursable by insurance contracts. See 






Table 6: Comprehensiveness and Loads on Typical Policy Purchased by a 65 Year Old  
 Comprehensiveness  Load 
Base Case  0.34 
 
.18 
Alternative assumptions     
Corporate interest rate  0.36  .27 
Real cost growth 3% / year  0.28  .11 
Real cost growth 0.75% / year  0.38  .21 
Top five companies  ----  .19 
Spousal Discount (10%)  ----  .14 
Assuming random lapsation  ----  0.51 
Note: Policy covers all three types of care (home health care, assisted living facility and nursing home), has a 60 days 
deductible, 4 year benefit period, and pays a $100 constant nominal daily benefit; this is Scenario 2 from the Weiss data. 
All estimates are done using unisex transition probabilities. Load is calculated using median premiums. “Base case” 
uses the Treasury term structure for the nominal interest rate, real cost growth of 1.5% per year, and all companies in 




Table 7: Loads of Typical Policy Purchased for 65 Year Old, By Gender  
  Male Female 
Base Case  0.44 -0.04 
 
Alternative assumptions     
Corporate interest rate  0.50  0.07 
Real cost growth 3% / year  0.40  -0.12 
Real cost growth 0.75% / year  0.46  -0.004 
Top five companies  0.45  -0.03 
Spousal Discount 10%     
Spousal Discount 25%     
Assuming random lapsation  0.65  0.38 
Note: Policy covers all three types of care (home health care, assisted living facility and nursing home), has a 60 days 
deductible, 4 year benefit period, and pays a $100 constant nominal daily benefit; this is Scenario 2 from the Weiss data. 
All estimates are done using gender-specific transition probabilities. Load is calculated using median premiums. All 
estimates use the Treasury term structure for the nominal interest rate, real cost growth of 1.5% per year, and all 





Table 8:  Comprehensiveness and loads of available policies; estimates are all for 65 year olds. 
  Male Female 
  Comp Load Comp Load 
Constant Nominal Benefits 
Scenario 1:  Facility only,           90 day deductible, two year benefit  period  0.27 0.28 0.21 -0.22 
Scenario 2: All 3 types of care,   60 day deductible, four year benefit period  0.38  0.44  0.32  -0.04 
Scenario 3: All 3 types of care,   30 day deductible, unlimited benefit period  0.49  0.55  0.47  0.03 
Scenario 4: All 3 types of care,   no deductible,       unlimited benefit period 
 
0.51 0.48 0.48 -0.10 
Benefits Escalate at 5% per year 
Scenario 1:  Facility only,           90 day deductible,  two year benefit  period 0.58 0.20 0.49 -0.47 
Scenario 2: All 3 types of care,   60 day deductible, four year benefit period  0.68  0.45  0.59  -0.08 
Scenario 3: All 3 types of care,   30 day deductible, unlimited benefit period  0.88  0.56  0.91  -0.03 
Scenario 4: All 3 types of care,    no deductible,      unlimited benefit period  0.92  0.52  0.94  -0.09 
Note: Policy covers all three types of care (home health care, assisted living facility and nursing home), has a 60 days 
deductible, 4 year benefit period, and pays a $100 constant nominal daily benefit; this is Scenario 2 from the Weiss data. 
All estimates are done using gender-specific transition probabilities. Load is calculated using median premiums. All 
estimates use the Treasury term structure for the nominal interest rate, real cost growth of 1.5% per year, and all 





















Note: Policy covers all three types of care with 60 day deductible, 4 year benefit period, $100 constant nominal daily 




  38 
Appendix Table A1: Comparison of nursing home (NH) utilization estimates: Robinson model and other published studies (65 year old). 
Model  Data Sources  Probability of ever 
entering a nursing home 
Average age of first entry into nursing 
home (conditional on entry) 





% of those who enter 
nursing home who 
spend more than  




Robinson Model  NLTCS (1982, 1984, 
1989 and 1994) and 
NNHS (1985) 
 




83 (mean)  1.8 years  40%  11% 
Dick et al (1994)  NLTCS (1982, and 1984) 
and NNHS (1985) 
 




 1.8  years  40%  12% 
Kemper and 
Murtaugh (1991) 
1986 National Mortality 
Followback Survey 
 
0.33 0.52  0.43      83  (mean)    55%  21% 
Murtaugh et al. 
(1997) 
 
1985 NNHS      0.39        2.7 years  51%  20% 
Wiener at al.  NLTCS (1982, 1984) and 
NNHS (1985) 
 
   0.49       2.2  years  45%  14% 
Note: All estimates for Robinson model are based on a version that estimates care utilization without regard to whether the care satisfies policy benefit triggers and 
without regard to the health condition of the individual at age 65. This is done to make the Robinson estimates comparable to published estimates that do not make 
these restrictions. The Robinson estimates used in the analysis in the paper, however, do incorporate these important restrictions.  
 
 